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The effectiveness of Dutch municipal recycling policies  
 
Elbert Dijkgraaf1, Raymond Gradus2 
 
 
Abstract 
The EU advocates a household waste recycling rate of more than 70%. Although the 
Netherlands already years ago invested in recycling policies heavily, this is still a large 
challenge as nowadays on average this rate is approximately 50% and nearly no 
municipalities have a rate above 70%. Given the experience, it is possible to learn from the 
Dutch experience which policies are effective in increasing the recycling rates. Based on a 
large panel data set for the Netherlands , we show that unit-based pricing, avoiding a duo-bin 
for unsorted and compostable waste, and moving back the frequency of collecting unsorted 
and compostable waste at the curbside are effective in raising the recycling rate. However, 
only unit-based pricing has a substantial effect. In nearly all cases changing the frequency of 
collection of recyclables had no or very small effects. We find some evidence for the 
effectiveness of adding bring locations to curbside collection. Based on an estimation of the 
cost function most policies have no effect on costs, except for unit-based pricing (saving on 
cost) and increases in the frequency of unsorted waste collection (cost increasing). Overall, it 
seems nearly impossible to reach the EU-goal of 70% with the policies applied.  
 
JEL classification: Q18, Q38, R11, R15. 
Keywords: recycling; waste policy; recycling; local government; Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction  
Lack of space and a growing environmental awareness forced Dutch governments to take 
measures early on in the 1980s and 1990s to reduce the landfilling of unsorted (household) 
waste and to stimulate recycling. Later on, these measures were intensified with a tax on 
landfilling, a landfill ban (see Dijkgraaf 2004) and very recently an incineration tax. Dutch 
municipalities are responsible for waste collection and they applied policies to stimulate the 
separation of waste. On average Dutch municipalities recycle 50% in the period 1998-2012, 
which is still below the EU-target of 70% as proposed by the European Commission (see 
Euroactiv (2014)). By law, Dutch municipalities are obliged to collect two types of waste at 
the curbside: compostable waste such as vegetable, food and garden waste and unsorted 
(household) waste. Since January 1994, compostable waste has been collected at the curbside. 
This was an important measure in increasing the separately collected amount of compostable 
waste. Furthermore, the municipalities are since 1994 obliged to provide an infrastructure for 
the separate collection of glass, paper and textile. They are not obliged, however, to collect 
these streams at the curbside. 
 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014b) show that there has been an increase in facilities at drop-off 
centers for collecting different waste streams such as paper, glass, textiles and also plastic 
packaging. This is a result of the municipal obligation to collect separately paper, glass, 
textiles and since recently also plastic packaging. Nevertheless, municipalities may choose 
how these materials are collected. Therefore, in some cases they are not collected at the 
curbside, but citizens can deliver them to collection points at central locations. In the literature 
there is discussion which method (curbside collection or drop- off centers) is most effective in 
collecting recyclables. For US municipal data, Beatty et al. (2007) show that the marginal 
impact of expanding curbside collection on recycled quantities is small, because curbside 
programs ‘cannibalize’ returns from drop-off centers. In fact, for aluminum and glass they 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between increased curbside access and the 
quantity recycled. However, for plastics they found a significant relation between the 
percentage of population served by curbside programs and the amount of recycled plastics.   
 
Several Dutch municipalities introduced unit- based pricing of unsorted and compostable 
waste as a measure to stimulate the separate collection of recyclables and to stimulate 
reducing the total amount of waste as well.  In the last ten years, more and more Dutch 
municipalities have implemented unit-based user fees. By 2012, 36% of Dutch municipalities 
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had implemented such a system, while in 1998 this was only 15%. Based on 1998–2000 
Dutch municipal data, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) find sizeable and significant effects 
resulting in less unsorted and more recyclable waste. Based on data until 2005–06 and 
corrected for environmental activism or municipal fixed effects, the effects of unit-based 
pricing (UBP) systems still remain large (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009) and Allers and 
Hoeben (2010)). For the period 1998-2010 a similar picture occurs, although there is some 
evidence that especially the effectiveness of the complex weight-based pricing system 
deteriorates over time (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014b)).   
 
In UK studies such information is not available as local government in the UK are not 
allowed to charge for waste collection (see Abbott et al. (2011, p. 2215)). As far as we known, 
research on how the effects of collection frequency and the unit-based pricing systems 
compare to each other does is limited. An important exception is Kinnaman and Fullerton 
(2000), who draws on US municipal survey data and investigates a garbage fee and curbside 
recycling program simultaneously. They show that the effect of a garbage fee on recycling is 
somewhat higher than those usually found in the literature, but it was insignificant. For a 
curbside recycling program they found that the (yearly) quantity of recycled materials 
increased with (almost) 200 US-pounds.3 However, their estimation is based on survey 1991-
data and it would be interesting to analyze recent panel data as this curbside recycling 
programs have developed over time. Moreover, panel data make it possible to include a fixed 
effect at the municipal level, which is important to understand the real effect of policy 
measures as it corrects of unobserved heterogeneity between municipalities (see for example 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a, 2014b)). 
 
Moreover, other authors claim that a key non-monetary initiative is the provision of a frequent 
curbside recycling services (see for example Callan and Thomas (1997, 2001), Kinnaman and 
Fullerton (2000), Ferrera and Missios (2005), Kipperberg (2007) and Usui (2008)). More 
recently, based on UK municipal panel data Abbott et al. (2011) study the determinants of dry 
recycling and composting rates separately. They suggest that it is helpful by explaining the 
variation in the total recycling rate to disaggregate in dry and composting recycling. For 
composting a complex pattern of its own frequency of collection, the residual waste collection 
frequency and the type of container is important. In addition, they show that there is evidence 
                                                     
3 One US pound is defined as 453 grams.  
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that a lower collection frequency of residual waste increases dry recycling rates. This is 
interesting as some Dutch policy advisers in the Netherlands suggest moving back the residual 
waste collections frequency could encourage recycling as well (see Reus and Jonkergouw 
(2013)). 
 
For the Netherlands until now no attention is given to the effectiveness of curbside collection 
of recyclables. This was due to a lack of data. In this contribution we fill this gap in the 
literature, based on a large panel data set (1998-2012) for the Netherlands with information on 
local waste policies. Moreover, we add to the literature by being able to distinguish the effect 
of curbside collection and type of container between unsorted, compostable, paper, glass, 
textile and plastic waste. Furthermore, we analyze whether combining drop-offs centers with 
curbside collection and whether type of curbside container (mini-bin, duo-bin for two 
different waste types4, bag or crate) influences the results. Finally, we are able to include 
fixed effects as we have a large panel. 
  
In the literature not only the effect of curbside collection on recycling rates plays an important 
role, but also the effects on the cost of waste collection. In Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a) we 
show that the effects of institutional modes (public, private, in-house) on costs are small and 
very often not significant. However, the cost effects for unit-based pricing differ per system 
and are sometimes large. Interestingly, based on cost reduction the bag-based and frequency-
based systems are preferred to the weight-based system (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a)). 
In this contribution we add the frequency of curbside collection and type of container to the 
cost function to test their influence on costs. If costs increase with a more frequent collection 
of unsorted waste this could be an additional argument for moving back the residual waste 
collections frequency.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, data and method are discussed. In section 3, 
estimation results for the recycling rates are given. In section 4, we give estimations for the 
cost function. Finally, section 5 contains some conclusions. 
 
                                                     
4 This duo-bin is in many occasions simultaneously used for unsorted waste and compostable waste. 
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2. Method and data 
Similar to Abbott et al. (2011)5, we model the local authority recycling rate as a function of 
socio-economic variables, unit-based pricing dummies, curbside frequency variables and 
dummies for nearby collection points as follows: 
 
ܴܴ௜௞௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅	ߚଵln	ሺܪܼሻ௜௧ ൅		ߚଶln	ሺܲܦሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷln	ሺܨܱሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚସln	ሺܻሻ௜௧ ൅	∑ ߛ௝௡௝ୀଵ ܷܤ ௝ܲ௜௧ ൅
	∑ ߠ௞௠௞ୀଵ ܨܴ௞௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߜ௞௠ᇲ௞ୀଵ ܤܴ௞௜௧ ൅ ∑ ∅ሺ݇, ݏሻଵஸ௞ஸ	௠ଵஸ௦ஸௗ	 ܥܴ௦௞௜௧ ൅ ߙ଴ ൅	ߝ௜௧,																		 (1) 
 
where RRikt is the recycling rate of municipality i of material k at time period t, ln(HZ) is the 
log of average household size, ln(PD) is the log of population density, ln(FO) is the log of the 
non-western foreigners share and ln(Y) us the log of income per inhabitant, UBPs are 
dummies with the value 1 for municipalities that use a unit-based pricing system of type j 
(volume, frequency, bags and weight), FRk is a variable that denotes for the k-th material the 
number of times in a year curbside collection takes place and BRj is a dummy variable with 
value 1 if for the k-th material there are central drop-off locations as well as curbside 
collection and CRskit, a dummy for container-type s (mini-bin, duo-bin, bag or crate with the 
mini-bin as benchmark). Finally, αi are municipal fixed effects and εi,t is the normally 
distributed error-term.6 
 
Data on unit-based pricing and the amount of waste and recyclables come from Agentschap 
NL. We have data for 519 municipalities for the period 1998–2012, with a total of 5,321 
observations.7 In addition, cost data on waste collection come from Agentschap NL as well. 
We have cost data for this period with a total of 6300 observations. Furthermore, Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS) also collects yearly information on the number of times in a year curbside 
collection of (unsorted) waste takes place and whether there are other facilities in a 
  
                                                     
5 Abbott et al. (2011) argue that the theoretical literature does not suggest a particular functional form for the 
relationship between recycling and independent variables. Therefore, recycling performance can enter the model 
in a variety of ways: volume; participation rate in curbside scheme; or recycling rate. Similar to Abbott et al. 
(2011), we choose the latter since most policymakers evaluate the effectiveness of recycling and waste 
management programmes by considering the recycling rate. 
6 In this case, it will be assumed that the standard errors for each municipality are not independently and 
identically distributed, that there is unknown correlation in εi,t between municipalities in group i within t, but that 
groups i and j do not have correlated errors (see Nichols and Schaffer (2007)). 
7 The number of Dutch municipalities decreased from 548 in 1998 to 415 in 2012. For 1998, data are available 
on 72% of the municipalities. From 2001, data on almost all municipalities (more than 95%) are available. For 
some small merged municipalities, data are only available in a couple of years. 
 6
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Average St.dev. Max. Min. Obs. 
Unsorted waste as % total collected waste 0.50 0.10 0.90 0.10 5321 
Compostable waste as % total collected waste 0.25 0.08 0.55 0.00 5321 
Paper waste as % total collected waste 0.18 0.05 0.47 0.00 5321 
Glass waste as % total collected waste 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.00 5321 
Textile waste as % total collected waste 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 5321 
Plastic waste as % total collected waste 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 1972 
Costs municipality (mln euro) 3.55 7.38 131.66 0.10 6300 
Household size 2.48 0.20 3.65 1.68 5321 
Population density 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.00 5321 
Foreigners/inhabitant 0.05 0.04 0.37 0.00 5321 
Income/inhabitant (thousand euro) 30.55 4.14 54.87 5.08 5321 
UBP: Volume 0.07 0.26 1 0 5321
UBP: Frequency 0.13 0.33 1 0 5321 
UPB: Bag 0.04 0.20 1 0 5321 
UBP: Weight 0.05 0.21 1 0 5321 
Bring: Paper 0.41 0.49 1 0 5321 
Bring: Glass 0.07 0.25 1 0 5321 
Bring: Textile 0.67 0.47 1 0 5321 
Frequency: Unsorted 30.41 10.19 52 4 1972 
Frequency: Compost 29.79 10.89 52 0 5321 
Frequency: Paper 14.91 11.21 52 0 5321 
Frequency: Glass 2.17 8.63 52 0 5321 
Frequency: Textile 5.70 9.24 52 0 5321 
Frequency: Plastic 6.60 10.19 52 0 1972
Unsorted: duo-bin 0.09 0.29 1 0 1972 
Unsorted: mini-bin 0.85 0.35 1 0 1972 
Unsorted: bag 0.12 0.32 1 0 1972 
Compostable: duo-bin 0.09 0.29 1 0 1972 
Compostable: mini-bin 0.90 0.30 1 0 1972 
Compostable: bag 0.02 0.14 1 0 1972 
Compostable: crate 0.01 0.10 1 0 1972 
Paper: duo-bin 0.01 0.08 1 0 1972 
Paper: mini-bin 0.35 0.48 1 0 1972 
Paper: bag 0.03 0.16 1 0 1972 
Paper: crate 0.59 0.49 1 0 1972 
Glass: duo-bin 0.00 0.02 1 0 1972 
Glass: mini-bin 0.01 0.08 1 0 1972 
Glass: crate 0.04 0.20 1 0 1972 
Textile: duo-bin 0.00 0.02 1 0 1972 
Textile: mini-bin 0.05 0.21 1 0 1972 
Textile: bag 0.56 0.50 1 0 1972 
Textile: crate 0.10 0.30 1 0 1972 
Plastic: duo-bin 0.00 0.07 1 0 1972 
Plastic: mini-bin 0.05 0.21 1 0 1972 
Plastic: bag 0.30 0.46 1 0 1972 
Plastic: crate 0.03 0.16 1 0 1972 
Note: Unsorted waste is not collected with crates and glass is not collected in bags. 
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municipality.8 That information is not available publicly and has been sent to us upon request 
in July 2014. Data for the socio-economic characteristics come from CBS as well and they are 
available publicly. For descriptive statistics, see Table 1 (see Appendix A for the variable 
definitions).  
 
For 1998-2012, the (recycling) rate is constructed separately for unsorted waste, glass, textile, 
paper and compostable waste. As we have only data for plastics from 2007 on, the plastic 
recycling rate is only constructed for 2007-2012. The same subsample is used for the 
container type variable as data before 2007 are not available.  
 
Figure 1. Recycling rates as % total waste 1998-2012 
 
 
While the Dutch’s recycling rate is more or less stable in time with the exception of plastic at 
the end of the period (Figure 1), it is noticeable that there are significant variations between 
municipalities. In Figure 2 we present the share of recycled waste in total waste and the 
number of municipalities, which recycle more in 1998 and 2012.     
 
Figure 2 shows that there are some municipalities which recycle more than 70% and there are 
a few municipalities which recycle less than 30%.9 On average, Dutch municipalities recycled 
                                                     
8 It should be noticed that in 2007 this VRAGENLIJST GEMEENTELIJK AFVAL has been changed dramatically 
and therefore some variables are only available from 2007 on.  
 
9 Due to mergers the number of municipalities between 1998 and 2012 decreased. In 1998 the number of 
municipalities with a recycling rate less than 70% was 383 (98%) and in 2012 it was 328 (95%).   
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Compost Paper Glass Textile Plastic
 8
50% of their waste in 1998 and 48% in 2012.  However, the number of municipalities with a 
recycling rate more than 70% is still small, although it doubled from 8 to 16.  
 
Figure 2. Recycled waste as share of total waste 
 
 
Dutch municipalities may choose how materials as paper, glass, textile and plastics are 
collected. If they are not collected at the curbside, citizens can deliver them to collection 
points at central locations nearby as shopping centers or schools.  Unsorted waste is collected 
at the curbside in all municipalities. For paper this is 89%. For textile this is 77% and for 
plastics this is 40%.10 There is a large difference between the frequency of collecting  
unsorted and compostable waste versus different recyclables (see Figure 3). In addition, most 
municipalities collect unsorted and compostable waste every two weeks. For compostable 
waste, 74% of the municipalities collect it every two weeks, while 15% collect it every week. 
These figures are 80% and 18% for unsorted waste. Most municipalities collect paper once 
each month (or every four weeks). For paper, 63% of the municipalities collect one time a 
month (11-14 times a year), while 14% collect two times a month (24-27 times a year) and 
5% collect each week. Glass and textile are collected at the curbside to a lesser extent. Of all 
municipalities 77% collect textile and 7% collect glass at the curbside. However, for textile 
48% of municipalities collect it every quarter. Plastics are collected at the curbside in 40% of 
the municipalities. Half of these municipalities collect it once a month and 9% twice a month.    
 
                                                     
10 For compostable waste curbside collection is 94%. It should be noticed that for compostable waste, although 
curbside collection is obliged by law, some municipalities get exemptions to collect compostable waste for large 
parts of their city as they are many flats (e.g. Amsterdam).  
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Figure 3. The curbside frequency, all municipalities, 1998-2012 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the number of pickups at the curbside on average for all municipalities. It 
shows that for most waste streams the frequency declines over time. The exceptions are the 
first few years for compostable waste, paper and textile and the last few years for plastic. 
 
The type of container differs considerable between different materials. For unsorted waste 
most municipalities collect it by a mini-bin of 120 or 240 liter (85%). Other municipalities 
collect it by a duo-bin (9%) or  a bag (12%).11 For compostable also a bin of 120 or 240 litters 
is dominant with 90%.12 Other containers for compostable waste are a duo-bin (9%), a bag 
(2%) or a crate (1%). However, for paper a crate is dominant with 59%.13 Other containers for 
papers are a mini-bin (35%), a duo-bin (1%) or a bag (3%). For glass mini-bin (1%) or a crate 
(4%) is used. Most glass is collected by drop-off facilities. For textile a bag is dominant with 
56%.14 Other containers for textile are a mini-bin (5%), a duo-bin or a crate (10%). Finally, 
for plastics a bag is the most important with 30%. Other containers for plastics are a mini-bin 
(5%) or a crate (3%). 
                                                     
11 In some municipalities more than one system is used, resulting in a total share higher than 100%.  
12 Our dataset does not contain information on the size of the container. 
13 Our dataset does not contain information about the size of this crate. In some municipalities the size is 
45x28x20 cm and these crates are distributed by the municipality. In some municipalities carton boxes (for 
example coming from sales in shops) are allowed to be used. 
14 In some municipalities these sacks are signed or have a special color.  
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Figure 4. The curbside frequency in number of pickups per year 
 
Note: for unsorted waste and plastics we have only data from 2007 on 
 
The way citizens pay for waste collection differs per municipality. In most Dutch 
municipalities, ranging from 85% in 1998 to 63% in 2012, a flat-rate system has been used. In 
other municipalities unit-based pricing is used for unsorted and/or compostable waste. This 
introduces a price with the incentive to reduce the quantity of waste and to sort the waste 
better. Thus, with UBP it is expected that municipalities collect less priced waste and more 
unpriced recyclable waste. As in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004, 2014), we distinguish between 
four different unit-based pricing (UBP) systems: volume, frequency, bag and weight. The 
volume-based program allows households to choose between different volumes of collection 
bins for unsorted and/or compostable waste; on average between 1998 and 2012 7% of Dutch 
municipalities used this rather crude UBP system. A more refined marginal price results from 
a frequency-based system, in which the household pays for the number of times the bin for 
unsorted and compostable waste is presented at the curbside. The share of municipalities 
using this system increased from 4% in 1998 to 19% in 2012 (on average 13%) and in 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a) we argue that this is due to the low administrative costs. In the 
bag-based system, households buy a special bag with specific marks for unsorted waste. This 
is a more refined pricing system than the frequency-based one, as the volume of the bags is 
significantly less than that of the bins. Importantly, the bag system allows households to 
change volume each week. The share of municipalities with such a system is stable, at 4% in 
1998 and 2012 and for most municipalities this bag is only used for unsorted waste. 
Maximum price incentives result from a weight-based system, pricing the unsorted and 
0
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compostable waste per kilogram. The collection vehicle weighs the bin before emptying and 
combines this information with the identity of the owner, stored in a chip integrated in the 
collection bin. The more refined weight-based system increased at the beginning of this 
century and due to large administrative costs stabilized after 2005 with 5%. 
 
3. Results  
We follow Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and estimate the material-specific recycling rates 
as a series of demand equations. Since the independent variables in each equation are the 
same, there is no bias from estimating the system as separate equations. First, we estimate 
equation (1) for the full sample and therefore we have to omit container type and the 
frequency for unsorted waste and plastics. Second, for the period 2007-2012 we can estimate 
all coefficients of equation (1). Table 2 and 3 shows the estimation results for the recycling 
rate functions (with for Table 3 also the plastic recycling rate). All estimations are based on 
pooled data with the robust cluster variance estimator with the municipality as the cluster 
indicator (see footnote 6).  
 
Table 2. Estimation results share in total waste (1998-2012) 
 
Unsorted (%) Paper (%) Compost (%) Glass (%) Textile (%) 
Household size -0.0152 0.0025 0.0770* -0.0122 -0.0153*** 
Population density -0.0149 0.0020 0.0143 -0.0043 0.0018 
Foreigners/inhabitant 0.0134** -0.0002 -0.0112* 0.0003 -0.0007 
Income/inhabitant -0.0172 0.0074 0.0062 0.0053 0.0044* 
UBP: volume -0.0223*** 0.0105*** 0.0104** 0.0018 0.0001
UBP: frequency -0.0242*** 0.0493*** -0.0531*** 0.0164*** 0.0023*** 
UBP: bag -0.1431*** 0.0319*** 0.0836*** 0.0139*** 0.0030 
UBP: weight -0.0501*** 0.0985*** -0.1043*** 0.0302*** 0.0043** 
Frequency: paper -0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Frequency: compostable 0.0004*** 0.0000 -0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0000** 
Frequency: glass -0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Frequency: textile -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Bring: paper -0.0026* 0.0018** 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0003** 
Bring: glass 0.0116* -0.0054 -0.0020 -0.0002 0.0001 
Bring: textile -0.0019 0.0022** -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0008*** 
R2 0.54 0.56 0.44 0.44 0.09 
Observations 5321 5321 5321 5321 5321 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. 
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Table 3. Estimations share in total waste with type of container (2007-2012) 
 
Unsorted (%) Paper (%) Compost (%) Glass (%) Textile (%) Plastic (%) 
Household size -0.1011 0.0623 0.2574** -0.0166 -0.0008 -0.1232** 
Population density -0.0060 0.0019 0.0074 -0.0076 -0.0084** 0.0140 
Foreigners/inhabitant 0.0190* -0.0087 -0.0060 -0.0055** -0.0001 0.0013 
Income/inhabitant -0.0264 -0.0801** 0.0913** -0.0018 0.0035 0.0410* 
UBP: volume -0.0331*** 0.0137*** 0.0206*** 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0039 
UBP: frequency -0.0383*** 0.0453*** -0.0383*** 0.0138*** 0.0024** 0.0200*** 
UBP: bag -0.2398** 0.0967*** 0.0705 0.0356*** 0.0061*** 0.0840*** 
UBP: weight -0.0783*** 0.0996*** -0.0866*** 0.0290*** 0.0070*** 0.0351*** 
Frequency: unsorted 0.0004** 0.0002* -0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Frequency: paper -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Frequency: compost 0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Frequency: glass 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
Frequency: textile 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0000* 0.0000 
Frequency: plastic 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Bring: paper -0.0010 0.0019* -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 
Bring: glass -0.0017 0.0019 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0027 
Bring: textile 0.0024 0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0007* 0.0002 -0.0008 
Unsorted: duo-bin -0.0847** 0.0169* 0.0415* 0.0119*** 0.0039** 0.0003 
Unsorted: bag  -0.0079 -0.0100* 0.0156*** 0.0018* -0.0002 -0.0002 
Compost: duo-bin 0.1184*** -0.0206** -0.0707*** -0.0108** -0.0052*** -0.0025 
Compost: bag -0.0117 0.0046 0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 
Compost: crate 0.0073 0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0053 0.0003 -0.0039 
Paper: duo-bin -0.0139 0.0039 0.0090 0.0009 0.0013 -0.0081 
Paper: bag  -0.0007 -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0004 
Paper: crate 0.0064** -0.0026 -0.0046* 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 
Glass: duo-bin -0.0008 0.0681*** -0.0506*** -0.0085*** 0.0055*** 0.0000*** 
Glass: crate 0.0144 -0.0080 -0.0040 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0171** 
Textile: duo-bin -0.0057 -0.0153* 0.0240*** 0.0029 -0.0007 0.0000*** 
Textile: bag  -0.0026 -0.0004 0.0041* 0.0003 0.0000 0.0009 
Textile: crate -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0016 0.0007 0.0000 0.0032** 
Plastic: duo-bin 0.0224 -0.0071 -0.0194 -0.0063 0.0000 0.0169*** 
Plastic: bag  -0.0071*** -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0004 0.0043*** 
Plastic: crate -0.0006 -0.0020 0.0021 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0012 
R2 0.52 0.60 0.39 0.43 0.04 0.23 
Observations 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 1165 
Notes: Mini-bin is benchmark, ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. 
 
 
Let us review the econometric results. In terms of the socio-economic variables we find that 
most variables have poor explanatory power. Only for 2007-2012 for paper and compostable 
waste the income coefficient is significant (at 95%) and one time positive and one time 
negative. According to Abbott et al. (2011) two opposing effects are working here. Higher 
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earners have a higher propensity to recycle because the environment is a luxury good but also 
have a higher opportunity cost of time which acts to reduce their recycling rates. For 
compostable waste, it is to be expected that higher income municipalities have more houses 
with bigger gardens and thus more compostable waste to recycle. Paper is far less income 
sensitive, making it explainable that the effect is different. Plastic and textile have a positive 
relation with income, resulting in significant higher recycling rates if income increases in 
some estimations. The estimated coefficient for population density is only significant and 
negative and for textile in the period 2007-2012. This result is similar to Callan and Thomas 
(1997) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), who both found a significant and negative 
relationship between population density and recycling. In the composting equation the 
coefficient for household size is significant (in the full panel at 90%) and positively signed. A 
reason for this result could be that larger households tend to live in larger properties e.g. 
detached housing with bigger garden space and hence more opportunity for composting. 
Interestingly, in the textile equation of the full panel the coefficient for household size is 
significant and negatively signed. A possible explanation for this is that larger households 
have more opportunity to transfer clothes in the same household. For plastic we also find a 
negative effect. It could be possible that larger family size results in higher opportunity costs 
of time due to increasing scarcity of time as more time is spend for the family. Based on our 
results, foreign people recycle less glass and compostable waste, although the last result is 
only significant at the 90%-level. This is contraire to results by Abbott et al. (2013, 2014) as 
they suggest that especially ethnic foreigners have a better social norm to recycle.15  
 
Our results for collection frequency are diverse, but in most cases we find an insignificant 
effect. Intuitively, we would expect a positive relationship between the frequency of 
collection and the quantity of collected waste. However, in most cases the frequency 
coefficients are very small and insignificant. Only for textile and unsorted waste in the 2007-
2012 panel we find a positive and significant result (see Table 3). Surprisingly, if the compost 
collection frequency increases the consequence in the full panel is a (small) rise in the 
compost rate. Abbott et al. (2011) argue that the nature of the composting activity is such that 
it takes place on a much more infrequent basis and in general the collection will not match to 
                                                     
15 Abbott et al. (2013, 2014) examine the role of social norms in general. Based on English local authority data 
they show that a social norm for recycling exists. In their empirical investigation the social norm is defined using 
(1) the age profile of the authority, (2) the ethnic profile; and (3) the educational attainment. In all three cases, 
the estimates for social norms are positively correlated with the recycling rate and the variable is shown to be 
statistically significant as well.  
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the compost-production set out by the household. A negative effect could be possible if more 
often collection is combined with smaller bins making the match even worse. However, as we 
have no data on the size of bins, we leave this for further research. 
 
For the cross effects we find in nearly all cases an insignificant coefficient. For the full panel 
four cross-effects are significant. But even in this case coefficients are very small.  
Interestingly, and also in line with Abbott et al. (2011) we find that a decrease in the 
frequency of unsorted waste collection increases the recycling rate of compostable waste (see 
Table 3). The intuition behind this result is that when faced with fewer unsorted waste 
collections, households have an incentive to exert more effort in separating compostable 
waste from unsorted waste. By its nature, compostable waste is bulky and organic (leading to 
rotting and smells) and both stimulate the desirability of separate and outdoors storage. 
 
The results for unit-based pricing systems are in line with the earlier literature for the 
Netherlands (e.g. Allers and Hoeben (2010), Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004, 2014a)).16 Unit-
based pricing systems are effective in reducing unsorted waste and stimulating recyclable 
waste. For the paper, glass, textile and plastic recycling rate nearly all UBP-coefficients are 
significant and positive. Especially, the bag-based system is effective in reducing the unsorted 
waste rate as from Table 2 it follows that the reduction is 14,3% (and from Table 3 the 
reduction is even larger with 24,0%17). However, disadvantages of the bag-based system are 
that Dutch legislation limits the number of bags carried per waste collection employee and 
that there is an incentive for households to put as much waste as possible in each bag, which 
makes them difficult to handle.18 Furthermore, it should be noticed that a policy of 
introducing a bag is contrary to the frequency and weight system as they stimulate home 
composting19. Interestingly, home composting lowers the (measured) recycling rate as it is not 
included in the official statistics. For the weight-based and frequency-based pricing system 
the disadvantages of the bag system are not taking place and in most cases there are sizeable 
                                                     
16 In Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) and Allers and Hoeben (2010) the effect of unit-based pricing on total waste, 
unsorted waste, (total) recyclable waste and compostable waste  is estimated. In Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a), 
the effect of unit-based pricing on costs is estimated.   
17 An explanation for this is that nowadays the bag-based system is generally used for unsorted waste only. Also 
Allers and Hoeben (2010) shows that the number of municipalities pricing compostable waste dropped markedly 
between 1997 and 2006. This point is also illustrated by Table 3, which shows that by using the bag-based 
system there is a (non-significant) increase in compostable waste.   
18 For some (coastal) municipalities there are some indications that bags have another disadvantage as births (like 
gulls) will give extra nuisance.    
19 In the Netherlands some municipalities stimulates home composting by subsidizing the purchase of home 
composting containers (see Linderhof et al. (2001)).  
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reductions in unsorted waste rate, although for these policies effects are not larger than 10%. 
The introduction of these unit-based pricing systems may, however, have adverse effects as 
well. Especially, the weight-system has large administrative costs and citizens may dump 
their waste illegally. However, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) and Allers and Hoeben (2010) 
show that there is no evidence that surrounding municipalities without unit-based pricing 
systems in fact collect part of the waste produced in Dutch municipalities with unit-based 
pricing systems. In other studies there is some evidence that illegal dumping is an important 
issue. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that for a unit-based pricing system in 
Charlottesville (Virginia, US), illegal dumping constitutes 28% of the total reduction in waste 
collected at the curb. 
 
For the full panel, in municipalities with curbside collection and extra bring locations for 
paper and textile we find more recyclables and less unsorted waste. However, for glass the 
coefficient is insignificant. It should be noticed that some glass in the Netherlands is recycled 
by the producer as a result of the packaging deposit money system for beer bottles. For 2007-
2012 when the full equation is estimated we find no effects at 95%. Only for paper we find a 
positive effect at 90%. Therefore, we can conclude that the evidence for bring locations is 
mixed.20  
 
We also get some interesting results for the type of container. It shows that most effects are 
found for the duo-bin. 21 The effect of the duo-bin is 3.4% more unsorted waste and 2.9% less 
compostable waste (compared with the benchmark, a normal bin). Also for paper and textile 
the effects are negative and therefore from a recycling point of view we should omit a duo-bin 
for these substances. The exception is plastic, where we find a small positive effect.  
 
For the other collection types only for bags a significant (and positive) effect is found on the 
own recycling rates. However, the effect is very small. Some collection types have cross-
effects. Collecting unsorted waste by bags increases the quantity of waste collected for 
compost and glass. This is explainable, as putting compostable waste in bags increases the 
risk of smells and putting glass in bags increases the risk of bag bursting. 
                                                     
20 Of course, these conclusion also depends on the way these bring locations are exactly located, but we have no 
information on this.   
21 Most duo-bins are used for simultaneously for unsorted and compostable waste. In appendix b we present the 
correlation coefficients for the independent variables. As observed in this appendix there is almost a perfect 
correlation (i.e. 0.98) between a duo-bin for unsorted waste and for compostable waste. Therefore, the effect of a 
duo-bin is the combination of both coefficients (for duo-bin unsorted and compostable waste) in Table 3. 
 16
4. Cost functions 
Similar to equation (1), we model municipal waste costs as a function of output (i.e. the 
number of households (HH)), socio-economic variables, unit-based pricing dummies, 
curbside frequency variables, dummies for nearby collection points and container types as 
follows: 
 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅	ߚ଴ln	ሺܪܪሻ௜௧ ൅	ߚଵln	ሺܪܼሻ௜௧ ൅		ߚଶln	ሺܲܦሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷln	ሺܨܱሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚସln	ሺܻሻ௜௧ ൅
	∑ ߛ௝௡௝ୀଵ ܷܤ ௝ܲ௜௧ ൅	∑ ߠ௞௠௞ୀଵ ܨܴ௞௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߜ௞௠ᇲ௞ୀଵ ܤܴ௞௜௧ ൅ ∑ ∅ሺ݇, ݏሻଵஸ௞ஸ	௠ଵஸ௦ஸௗ	 ܥܴ௦௞௜௧ ൅ ߙ଴ ൅
	ߝ௜௧,																																																																																																																																				 (2) 
 
In equation (2) Cit are the (total) real waste costs in municipality i at time period t and HHit is 
the number of households in municipality i at time period t. It is quite common to include 
such an output factor in these cost functions to correct for scale effects (see Callan and 
Thomas (2001), Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013, 2014a)). The estimations are given in Table 4.  
Let us first discuss the unit-based pricing effects. The results with respect to the unit-based 
pricing systems for the full panel are comparable with Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014a). The cost 
advantage of introducing a system based on the volume of the collection is smallest, at 
4.4%.22 The UBP system based on frequency reduces the total costs by 9.6%. Notice that, 
based on cost reduction, the bag-based system is preferred to the weight-based system. The 
cost reduction is much smaller (7.8%) for the weight-based system than for the bag-based 
system (12.8%), as administrative costs are much higher for the weight system and the bag 
system reduces unsorted waste more. The estimate for the output factor, which is the number 
of households, indicates constant returns to scale as the coefficient is very close to 1.  
 
Some different results are found if we limit the panel to the period 2007-2012 (see second 
column Table 4). The cost advantage for unit-based pricing systems disappears. For the 
volume-based and the bag-based frequency system the advantage even become a 
disadvantage. For the frequency-based and weight-based the cost-advantage effect is smaller 
and insignificant. Based on robustness tests it can be shown that this is due to technical 
reasons. If we exclude fixed effects and we compare the UBP effects for the full panel and  
                                                     
22 As the dependent variable is in logs, the effects of the UBP dummies are calculated using ex−1, where x is the 
estimated coefficient. 
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Table 4. Estimations share in total waste with type of container (2007-2012) 
 
1998-2012 2007-2012 
Households 0.9923*** 1.0757*** 
Household size 0.4275** 1.2775*** 
Population density -0.0352 -0.1264 
Foreigners/inhabitant -0.0078 -0.0045 
Income/inhabitant 0.1937** -0.0999 
UBP: volume -0.0445*** 0.0183 
UBP: frequency -0.1010*** -0.0381 
UBP: bag -0.1380** 0.0697** 
UBP: weight -0.0812** -0.0506 
Frequency: unsorted - 0.0010*** 
Frequency: paper -0.0001 -0.0003 
Frequency: compost 0.0000 -0.0002 
Frequency: glass -0.0002 -0.0003 
Frequency: textile -0.0002 0.0001 
Frequency: plastic - -0.0002 
Bring: paper 0.0015 0.0007 
Bring: glass 0.0027 0.0062 
Bring: textile -0.0041 0.0019 
Unsorted: duo-bin - 0.0548 
Unsorted: bag - -0.0129 
Unsorted: crate - -0.0448 
Compost: duo-bin - -0.0685 
Compost: bag - -0.0314 
Compost: crate - 0.0101 
Paper: duo-bin - -0.0386 
Paper: bag - -0.0052 
Paper: crate - 0.0097 
Glass: duo-bin - 0.0019 
Glass: crate - -0.0397 
Textile: duo-bin - -0.0072 
Textile: bag - -0.0096 
Textile: crate - 0.0099 
Plastic: duo-bin - -0.0257 
Plastic: sack - 0.0049 
Plastic: crate - -0.0018 
R2 0.97 0.95 
Observations 6300 2362 
Notes: Mini-bin is benchmark, ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. 
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2007-2012 panel the differences are very small.23 Evidently, with the small 2007-2012 panel, 
the fixed effects absorbe to much variance in the data. Therefore, we conclude that the UBP 
costs effects can be represented by the first column of Table 4. We still present these results 
as we have only data for collection type and the frequency of collection for unsorted and 
plastic waste for the 2007-2012 panel. Robustness tests show that the results for these 
variables do not change significantly if we exclude fixed-effects. 24 
 
It should be noticed that none of the container variables is significant in the cost estimation. 
So, choices should be based on quantitative effects on waste collection. For most frequency 
variables the effect is small and insignificant. However, costs will increase if the frequency of 
residual waste increases. This is due to two elements: more substitution between unsorted 
waste and compostable waste and higher transportation costs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In the Netherlands there is a long history of policies to stimulate household recycling of 
waste. On average, Dutch municipalities recycle approximately 50% and only a small number 
of municipalities recycle more than 70%, the goal which has been announced by the European 
Union. By using panel data for 1998–2012 we explain recycling rates for household waste. 
We explore which policies are effective in increasing the recycling rates of different materials 
as paper, glass, textiles and from 2007 on also plastic packaging. Our main conclusion is that 
it is hard to achieve this goal as not many policies have a significant and large effect on the 
recycling rates. 
 
In line with earlier contributions (e.g. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004, 2014a)), we show that 
unit-based pricing systems such as the weight- and bag-based systems are very effective as 
the reductions in unsorted waste are sizeable and recyclables increase substantially. However, 
even for these policies effects are not larger than 10%, while most effects are only a few 
percents. Furthermore, these systems can have some adverse effects such as administrative 
costs and risks of illegal dumping. The bag-based system can be more effective in reducing 
unsorted waste but it has additional adverse effects on other policies such as home 
composting and there are problems with carrying these bags, smells and bag bursting. 
Interestingly, we show that avoiding a duo-bin for unsorted and compostable waste decreases 
                                                     
23 These results are available on request.  
24 Also these results are available on request.  
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the unsorted waste rate with more than 3%. In addition, also avoiding a crate for paper and 
introducing a bag for plastics is effective in reducing the unsorted waste rate, although the 
effects are substantially smaller. Overall only bag-based pricing results in substantially higher 
recycling rates, which makes the goal of 70% in the EU for many municipalities out of reach. 
 
Other important explanations for the (recycling) rate are social norms and socio-economic 
circumstances (see also Abbott et al. (2013, 2014)). We show that especially the share of non-
western foreigners is important in explaining the unsorted waste rate and household size plays 
an important role in explaining the recycling rate of compostable and textile. Based on these 
estimations it can be argumented that larger cities with many foreigners, a small household 
size and less possibilities for composting will not achieve such a goal. By estimating a cost 
function we show that moving back the frequency of unsorted waste and applying unit-based 
pricing lowers costs. Changing other types of frequency and the type of container has no 
influence on total collection cost. 
 
There are many avenues to explore in future research. First, further explaining Dutch 
recycling rates can be of interest. In the literature, it is shown that especially educational 
attainment and age profile of citizens in a municipality are important in explaining these rates 
(see Abbott et al. (2013))). Second, it is important to have more data available especially for 
container type, plastics and the frequency of collecting unsorted waste. Currently, we have 
panel data for six years but as the unit-based pricing results show the results can be sensitive 
for including a fixed effect for municipality. Third, a municipal decisions can be influenced 
by a neighboring municipality for example if collection is combined or if external effects are 
present (like illegal dumping in other municipalities), and this can be tested using spatial 
models (see Brueckner (2003)). Fourth, also estimating the social costs functions of different 
recycling options can be of interest. Recently, Kinnaman et al. (2014) shows that average 
social costs are minimized with recycling rates well below mandated levels in Japan. Based 
upon the results of that paper, it appears that the 20% recycling rate in Japan is higher than the 
socially optimal rate (10%). There is some evidence that this is also the case for Europe as 
well (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014c)).  
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Appendix A. Definition of variables 
 
Unsorted waste as % total collected waste Collected unsorted waste per inhabitant as percentage of total collected 
waste per inhabitant 
Compostable waste as % total collected waste Separately collected compostable waste per inhabitant as percentage of 
total collected waste per inhabitant 
Paper waste as % total collected waste Separately collected paper waste per inhabitant as percentage of total 
collected waste per inhabitant 
Glass waste as % total collected waste Separately collected glass waste per inhabitant as percentage of total 
collected waste per inhabitant 
Textile waste as % total collected waste Separately collected textile waste per inhabitant as percentage of total 
collected waste per inhabitant 
Plastic waste as % total collected waste Separately collected plastic waste per inhabitant as percentage of total 
collected waste per inhabitant 
Costs municipality (mln euro) Total waste collection costs per municipality in million euro 
Household size Number of inhabitants per household 
Population density Municipal area in square meters per household 
Foreigners/inhabitant Share of non-western foreigners in total number of inhabitants 
Income/inhabitant (thousand euro) Income per inhabitant in thousand euro 
UBP: Volume Dummy is 1 if volume-based pricing system is present and 0 otherwise 
UBP: Frequency Dummy is 1 if frequency-based pricing system is present and 0 otherwise 
UPB: Bag Dummy is 1 if bag-based pricing system is present and 0 otherwise 
UBP: Weight Dummy is 1 if weight-based pricing system is present and 0 otherwise 
Bring: Paper Dummy is 1 if municipality has curbside collection of paper and a bring 
system. 
Bring: Glass Dummy is 1 if municipality has curbside collection of glass and a bring 
system. 
Bring: Textile Dummy is 1 if municipality has curbside collection of textile and a bring 
system. 
Frequency: Unsorted Number of times a year unsorted waste is collected at the curbside 
Frequency: Compost Number of times a year compostable waste is collected at the curbside 
Frequency: Paper Number of times a year paper waste is collected at the curbside 
Frequency: Glass Number of times a year glass waste is collected at the curbside 
Frequency: Textile Number of times a year textile waste is collected at the curbside 
Frequency: Plastic Number of times a year plastic waste is collected at the curbside 
Unsorted: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if unsorted waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-bin 
Unsorted: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if unsorted waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-bin 
Unsorted: bag Dummy is 1 if unsorted waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
Unsorted: crate Dummy is 1 if unsorted waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
Compostable: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if compostable waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-
bin 
Compostable: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if compostable waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-
bin 
Compostable: bag Dummy is 1 if compostable waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
Compostable: crate Dummy is 1 if compostable waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
Paper: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if paper waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-bin 
Paper: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if paper waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-bin 
Paper: bag Dummy is 1 if paper waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
Paper: crate Dummy is 1 if paper waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
Glass: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if glass waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-bin 
Glass: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if glass waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-bin 
Glass: bag Dummy is 1 if glass waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
Glass: crate Dummy is 1 if glass waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
Textile: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if textile waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-bin 
Textile: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if textile waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-bin 
Textile: bag Dummy is 1 if textile waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
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Textile: crate Dummy is 1 if textile waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
Plastic: duo-bin Dummy is 1 if plastic waste is collected at the curbside by a duo-bin 
Plastic: mini-bin Dummy is 1 if plastic waste is collected at the curbside by a mini-bin 
Plastic: bag Dummy is 1 if plastic waste is collected at the curbside by a bag 
Plastic: crate Dummy is 1 if plastic waste is collected at the curbside by a crate 
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Appendix B: Correlation- coefficients of exogenous variables  
Frequency: 
unsorted 
Frequency: 
paper 
Frequency: 
compost 
Frequency: 
glass 
Frequency: 
textile 
Frequency: 
plastic 
Bring: 
paper 
Bring: 
glass 
Bring: 
textile 
Unsorted: 
duo-cont 
Unsorted: 
bag 
Unsorted: 
crate 
Frequency: unsorted 1.00 
Frequency: paper 0.05 1.00 
Frequency: compost 0.41 0.07 1.00 
Frequency: glass 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Frequency: textile 0.01 0.25 0.04 0.60 1.00 
Frequency: plastic 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.14 1.00
Bring: paper 0.08 0.15 0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.01 1.00 
Bring: glass -0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.77 0.43 0.03 -0.04 1.00 
Bring: textile 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.25 0.12 0.20 0.06 1.00 
Unsorted: duo-bin 0.41 -0.01 0.51 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
Unsorted: bag 0.51 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.05 -0.07 1.00
Unsorted: crate 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 1.00 
Compost: duo-bin 0.42 0.00 0.52 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.98 -0.07 -0.01 
Compost: bag 0.19 -0.01 0.28 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.33 0.14 
Compost: crate 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.21 
Paper: duo-bin 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.24 -0.03 0.00 
Paper: bag -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Paper: crate 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Glass: duo-bin 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
Glass: crate -0.02 0.20 -0.01 0.65 0.35 0.03 -0.03 0.72 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 
Textile: duo-bin -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
Textile: bag 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.48 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Textile: crate 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.24 0.25 -0.01 0.01 0.27 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Plastic: duo-bin 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.00 
Plastic: bag -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.01
Plastic: crate -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.22 -0.07 -0.02 0.21 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
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Compost: 
duo-cont 
Compost: 
bag 
Compost: 
crate 
Paper: 
duo-cont 
Paper: 
bag 
Paper: 
crate 
Glass: 
duo-cont 
Glass: 
crate 
Textile: 
duo-cont 
Textile: 
bag 
Textile: 
crate 
Plastic: 
duo-cont 
Plastic: 
bag 
Plastic: 
crate 
Compost: duo-cont 1.00 
Compost: bag -0.03 1.00 
Compost: crate 0.03 0.26 1.00 
Paper: duo-cont 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
Paper: bag 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 1.00
Paper: crate 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.17 1.00 
Glass: duo-cont 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
Glass: crate -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 1.00 
Textile: duo-cont 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Textile: bag 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 1.00
Textile: crate -0.01 0.13 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.03 0.35 -0.01 -0.33 1.00 
Plastic: duo-cont 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.23 0.03 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
Plastic: bag -0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 1.00 
Plastic: crate 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.06 0.27 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
 
